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THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF AGRICULTURE AND THE RISE OF RURAL POLITICAL PROTEST IN BLACK AFRICA

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I. INTRODUCTION

Throughout the developing world, the commercialization of agriculture has been highly ambiguous in its effects. On the one hand, it has brought prosperity to rural farm families. On the other, it has produced political grievances and generated social conflict. These paradoxical consequences have been as true in Africa as they have elsewhere in the developing world. In this essay, I look at the relationship between the commercialization of agriculture and the rise of political protest in that continent. And I do so by addressing the question: Why would rural dwellers find it reasonable to demand political action in support of their efforts to make themselves economically better off by seeking to take advantage of commercial markets for their products?

In answering this question, I will examine several of the major issues which arose in the countryside during the colonial period in Africa. These issues include protests over governmental regulation of agricultural production, protests concerning the structure of markets, conflicts over land tenure, and disputes over

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taxes. Taken together, confrontations over these issues made up much of the rural political agenda in Africa during the colonial period.

Some of these issues were more significant in some places than in others. Disputes over the structure of markets most frequently arose in the forest areas of West Africa and in the cotton-producing regions about Lake Victoria, whereas conflicts over land use regulations most frequently arose in the savanah farmlands of East Africa. The relative significance of the issues varied over time as well. Disputes over land tenure were most important at the onset of the large-scale commercialization of agriculture, that is in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, while the conservation issue rose to prominence after the intensification of agricultural production had begun to make a major impact on the environment and ecology of the farming areas -- i.e. in the 1930s and 1940s. The importance of these issues thus varied over space and time. But, over the continent as a whole and over the colonial period in its entirety, these issues accounted for a large portion of the political grievances of the African countryside. And the successful exploitation of these issues by nationalist politicians enabled them to mobilize rural political support for the movements which made Africa ungovernable by foreign powers and thereby led to political independence throughout most of sub-Saharan Africa.

II. HISTORIAL BACKGROUND

The rise of commercial agriculture in Africa was in large part a response to the nineteenth century growth of the economies of

Europe. In the nineteenth century, Britain's industrial revolution neared completion, and Germany rapidly became a major industrial power. While the economies of other areas of Europe offer a more ambiguous record, it is nonetheless true that the nineteenth century saw the establishment of many of Europe's major industrial centers -- centers of mining, heavy industry and manufacturing; centers of commerce, finance, and shipping; and major urban areas.

With the transformation of the European economy came a rise in demand for Africa's primary products. This demand found its origins in the new technologies employed by European enterprises; in the increased number and higher average incomes of Europe's population; in changes in taste, some of which were associated with a move to an urban and industrial life style; and shifts in the relative price of Africa's products by comparison with close substitutes -- shifts in part accounted for by changes in transport technologies and in part by apparent inelasticities in alternative sources of supply.

It is obvious but important: Europe's industrial revolution was in large part based on the use of machines. The machines required lubrication. Not until the 1860s were petroleum products available, however; and until that time the oils and fats produced from animal and vegetable sources served as the basic source of lubricants. While the fats and oils produced by animals appear to have provided most of the lubricants, the increased use of machinery drove up the price of these products to the point where vegetable oils, though technically inferior, nonetheless became

attractive as substitutes. A major result was a rise in the demand of palm products from West Africa.

The growth of Europe's urban population, the rise in average incomes in Europe, and the change in tastes associated with the move to an urban and industrial life style -- these too had important consequences for Africa's rural economies. Their effects are perhaps best seen in the growth of demand for candles and soap. Both products use animal and vegetable oils; but, in the case of both products, vegetable oils soon displaced animal products. In part, they did so simply because of their technical superiority; in soaps, for example, the vegetable oils were less likely to discolor and they produced an odor that consumers found more attractive.[1] Palm oil, palm kernel oil, cotton seed oil, and groundnuts -- these were the major sources of vegetable oils for these products. And Africa, along with other tropical areas, became an important source of supply for these commodities.

Larger numbers of consumers and higher personal incomes also led to an increased demand for cotton. In the nineteenth century, Africa was seen as a particularly important source of supply for this commodity because alternative suppliers had proved unreliable. Lachcashire "cotton famines" were periodic events in the nineteenth century. The American civil war in the 1860s and the spread of the boll weevil in the 1890s made for unpredictable and increasingly expensive supplies of cotton to the British millers and to efforts on their part to develop alternative sources. They therefore sought out new areas for cotton growing. Part of

Livingstone's mandate was to search for sites for cotton production in Africa, and the reports from commercial and governmental sources in Africa convinced the British manufacturers that the interior of that continent offered good prospects. In league with the heavy steel industry -- itself recessed due to the completion of orders for the manufacture of engines, bridges, and rails for the European, Russian, American, and Indian railways -- the cotton manufacturers backed the building of railways into the interior of Africa and the promotion of cotton production therein.[2]

The rise in the average incomes of European consumers and shifts in taste also increased the demand for "luxury" products. Cocoa furnishes an example of such a commodity. First introduced as a beverage, cocoa then penetrated the confectionary market in the form of milk chocolate -- a product first introduced in the late 1870s. Coffee too appears to have benefited from such changes in taste, but also important was the behavior of other suppliers. Thus, the attempt by Sao Paulo producers to force a price rise in the world coffee market in the early 1900s created favorable conditions for the establishment of a coffee industry in Africa.

Technological change also played an important part in the rising demand for African cash crops. In the mid-nineteenth century, the development of steamships on the one hand and the opening of the

Suez Canal on the other dramatically lowered transport costs and enhanced the relative position of African producers in the European market. The development of hydrogenation in the 1920s also represented a major boon to African producers. The rising costs of animal products had made oleo an expensive ingredient in the manufacture of margarine; but vegetable oils tended to melt at room temperatures. With the development of hydrogenation, a technique for "hardening" vegetable oils, vegetable oils became a technically feasible substitute for oleo, and the producers of vegetable oils won a new market for their output.

Changes in the basic factors of demand on the European market -- the number of consumers, their average incomes, the technologies of production, and the behavior of alternative suppliers -- thus led to an increased demand for the products grown in Africa. African farmers responded by producing crops for export to the European market: palm oil, palm kernels, cocoa, cotton, coffee and groundnuts.[3]

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The transformation of African agriculture was not confined solely to the production of cash crops for export, however. It also took place in the production of food crops for the domestic markets of Africa. The transporting, bulking, and shipping of export crops required the formation of basic infrastructure; among the basic facilities required were railways and harbors.

The first railways were completed in the early 1900s. Basic harbor facilities were also begun in the early 1900s. A major expansion in the railways, through the construction of spur lines, and a major upgrading of the harbor facilities, through the construction of deep water berths, warehouses, and wharves, took place in association with the commodity boom of the 1920s. The construction of railways and harbors led to the growth of an African labor force. By 1920, the population of Dakar had reached 30,000; Accra, 38,000; and Lagos, 100,000. In the early 1930s, the mining companies of the Zambian copperbelt employed over 30,000 people.[4] The growth of wage labor in Africa entailed a rise in the demand for food. Maize, rice, casava, meat, fish, millet -- these and other commodities which the subsistence farmers had produced for themselves could now be sold for a profit.

The rise in demand for cash crops for export and the rise in demand for food crops for local consumption -- both generated opportunities for higher rural incomes.[5] The question we ask is why and in what way did the growth of economic opportunity lead to the rise of political protest? To answer this question we will examine some of the basic issues that arose in conjunction with the growth of commercial production in the African countryside.

III. THE STRUCTURE OF MARKETS

One of the primary issues which promoted agrarian protest in colonial Africa was the structure of the markets faced by the producers of cash crops. The commercialization of agriculture promoted significant economic gains; but, in some cases, the producers faced cartels

which sought to appropriate these gains by engaging in price setting behavior. Collusion on the part of the purchasers of the cash crops furnished an incentive for the producers to combine and so achieve market power in an effort to increase their profits.

One example of this kind of behavior is provided by the cocoa producers in the Gold Coast. The major links between the cocoa producers and the European markets were provided by merchant houses; these merchant houses handled both the export of cocoa from the Gold Coast to Europe and the importation into the Gold Coast of consumer products from the European market. For a variety of reasons there were significant economies of scale in the import-export business[6] consolidation therefore took place within the industry and the number of merchant houses declined. By 1937, the largest four of these firms marketed over two-thirds of the Gold Coast cocoa crop. Because they so dominated the market, these few firms could, by combining, effectively set the price of cocoa to their advantage and so appropriate much of the gains to be made from the production of cocoa. The best documented of their attempts to do so comes from the 1930s.

Early in 1937, the major merchant houses began negotiations in an effort to collude in the purchase of that year's output; by autumn, they had developed a market sharing agreement.[7] On the 18th of September, the headquarters of the firms in England sent letters of instruction to their buyers in the Gold Coast outlining the procedures to be followed in purchasing the crop; the procedures, of course, were designed to remove incentives for competition between the local buyers and thereby depress the price they offered the cocoa farmers. Rumors were rife in the Gold Coast about the activities of the major firms; local newspapers openly speculated concerning the possibility of an agreement. In the words of the Nowell report:

> By [mid-October] the formation of the so-called "Pool" was becoming widely known, and in a circular letter dated 14th of October, the President of the Provincial Council of Chiefs of the Central Province called an emergency meeting of the Council to "protest against this selfish and inimical policy enunciated by the trading firms."[8]

As land owners, cocoa farmers, and holders of stocks of cocoa, and as political leaders in the farming areas, the chiefs had major interest in preventing a forceful reduction in the price of cocoa. They therefore combined with the farmers and attempted to form, in effect, a producers' cartel, and so rival the power achieved by the merchant houses in the market for their products. By passing ordinances in their Native Authorities, issuing edicts, and even invoking traditional oaths, the chiefs, in league with the farmers, sought to withhold cocoa from the market until they had secured a price rise from the merchant houses. The resultant cocoa boycott led to the large-scale politicization of the rural interior of the Gold Coast, and furnished one of the historical legends that shaped the nationalist consciousness of the colony's rural population.

A similar situation arose in East Africa, where the producers of cotton also faced a noncompetitive market -- one that was used by the purchasers and processors of the commodity to lower the price they paid for the farmers' output. Again, the structure of the market furnished an incentive for the producers to combine. In the case of East Africa, the farmers combinations took the form of

cooperative socities -- agencies which the farmers tried to use to break the power of the purchasers and thus to realize higher profits from cash crop production.

In the production and processing of cotton in East Africa, economies of scale tended to concentrate in the ginning, as opposed to the growing, of cotton. The ginners had relatively high fixed costs: the buildings and machinery of the gineries represented significant capital investments. Moreover, the machines, at least, could be used for no other purpose than ginning and so stood idle for much of the year. An important consideration for a prospective investor in ginning, then, was the certainty of a high volume of cotton for processing at the time of harvest.

To promote cotton production in East Africa, the governments of the area sought to promote investments in ginning capacity; and to secure such investments, they sought ways of guaranteeing to prospective investors a high volume of produce for each gin. In the case of both Uganda and Tanganyika, the major cotton growing areas, the governments therefore passed ordinances requiring ginning licenses, and they restricted the number of licenses that could be issued. Moreover, they formed marketing zones. In a specified area about each gin, only buyers who sold to that gin were permitted to operate; and no shipping across the zones was allowed. The curtailment of competition on the part of the ginners naturally led to a decline in the price offered the farmers for their produce.[9]

One result was protest on the part of the producers. Thus, for example, in 1934 "all the <u>saza</u> chiefs in Busoga signed a letter to the provincial commissioner expressing. . .their dislike of zoning, which 'gives an opportunity to the cotton buyers to reduce the prices of cotton, knowing that people cannot remove their cotton and sell it in other neighbouring districts. . . .'"[10] Another result was the formation of the cooperative movement. The farmers sought to form cooperatives which would buy and gin cotton; by entering the market, the farmers sought to insure for themselves better prices than those offered by the cartelized ginners and so reap more the gains from cash crop production. One movement of this kind was the famous Victoria Federation of Cooperative Unions in Tanganyika -- a society that helped to form the nucleus of the nationalist movement in the north eastern regions of that territory.[11] Another was the Uganda African Farmers Union. The Farmers Union made the grievances of the cotton producers a central issue in the 1949 disturbances in Uganda -- disturbances that lay the foundation for the postwar period of national protest in that territory.[12]

IV. PRODUCTION EXTERNALITIES, GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION, AND POLITICAL PROTEST

Producers of cash crops in Africa thus sometimes faced a market structure which threatened to divert much of the gains to be had from commercial agriculture to other parties in the industry. Collusion on the part of others served as an incentive for the producers themselves to combine. And attempts to achieve the power to influence prices in the marketplace thus motivated collective

action in the countryside of Africa.

A second group of issues arose around externalities generated in the production of cash crops. Externalities occur when the activities of one producer directly influence the production possibilities of another. If the activity of one producer adversely affects the profits of another, in the absence of market mechanisms for creating incentives to adjust his behavior, the first producer will engage in more of that activity than is desirable; greater total profits could be secured by producers as a whole were he to reduce the degree to which he engaged in that activity. If the activity creates beneficial effects for the second party, in the absence of market mechanisms for creating incentives for the first producer to provide the beneficial externality, he will engage in less of the activity than is desirable. Under such circumstances, there are gains to be made if the government were to intervene in the market and provide the incentives for the first producer to increase the level at which he employs the activity which generates external effects. In the case of cash crop production in Africa, negative externalities appear to have been more common than positive ones; and the colonial government had frequently to curtail activities which were privately profitable but socially undesirable. A major result was protest on the part of cash crop producers who benefited from the use of externality-producing production techniques and a willingness to turn against the colonial government.

One common source of production externalities was erosion. During the Second World War, the colonial government promoted the production of cash crops and at a maximum rate, irrespective of the effects on the ecology or the environment. In East Africa, for example, they vigorously championed the production of maize, largely as a way of securing food for troops in the Mideast and North Africa. One result was extreme monocropping, with the attendant depletion of the soils; another was the extension of cash-crop production into increasingly marginal lands. The result of both trends was increased soil erosion.

An important example of this problem arose in the Uluguru mountains of north eastern Tanzania. The mountains formed an important watershed and were the source of several streams and rivers. In response to the increased demand for food, producers had moved up the mountains and cleared them of trees, shrubs, and ground-cover so as to put them into production. According to government sources, the effect of increased production on the hills was decreased production downstream. With less ground cover, the soils of the hills retained the rain waters for a shorter period than before. One result was downstream flooding and the loss of crops by those who planted alluvial gardens. Moreover, with the more precipitate release of the waters deposited by the rains, the dry season level of the rivers declined. Salt water from the ocean therefore moved further upstream; the result was increased salinization and a loss in the fertility of the soils near the rivers. As is true everywhere in Africa, the major concentrations of population were located along the rivers of northeastern Tanzania.

and their loss of crops due to the increased runoff from the hills more than offset the increase in the production of foodstuffs by the mountain producers.

The colonial government was unable to devise mechanisms whereby the downstream producers could make it to the advantage of the hillside producers to clear less land, or whereby the mountain producers could compensate the downstream farmers for the damage which they inflicted by bringing the hillsides into production. Instead, the government had to attempt to use political power to alter the productive practices of the hillside farmers. Using its legal powers, the government sought to compel the hillside farmers to make bench terraces so as to curtail runoff from the hills. The farmers resisted the government's efforts. At first, they attempted to bribe the government's agents; when that failed, they turned to violence. In 1956, riots broke out, troops were called in, and people were killed in the confrontation which followed. A new group of rural dwellers joined the antigovernment coalition formed by the nationalist movement.[13]

Erosion is one source of externalities, and measures taken to control it led to political protest throughout East Africa.[14] Another source of externalities are crop diseases; and an important source of rural political protest in West Africa were the attempts of the colonial governments to control the spread of diseases through the cocoa industry of that region.

In 1936, officials of the department of agriculture of the Gold Coast first noted the death of cocoa trees in the older producing areas: New Juaben and Akim Abuakwa. They were sufficiently concerned to investigate further, and upon doing so, they discovered that significant infestation had taken place over an area of 200 square miles. Because of the physical markings which it left on the trees, the disease was called "swollen shoot." At first it was misdiagnosed, and only after the completion of a new research station -- the first agricultural research station to be built in the Gold Coast -- was the government able to recognize the disease as a virus whose vector was the mealie bug. What made the virus so difficult to control was that ants served as hosts for the mealie bugs and provided protective shelters for them -- shelters which made the insects inaccessible to sprays. The only viable control was the destruction of diseased trees; included in these efforts were adjacent, apparently healthy trees, but ones which may well have provided shelter for the infected insects. Following World War II, the government launched its control program.[15]

The major problem faced by the government was the resistance of the farmers themselves. And a principal reason for the clash between the farmers and the government was that each farmer evaluated the control measure from the point of view of his own private gains and losses, whereas the government took into account the effects of his behavior on other cocoa producers. A farmer who kept diseased trees in production -- and trees often would continue to produce for several harvests after infestation -- would continue to earn profits, but he would be imposing costs on other farmers, in terms of increasing the probability of the infestation of their farms.

Were there a way that other farmers could charge a farmer with diseased trees for the injury he inflicted on their healthy ones, then control measures could perhaps have been voluntarily implemented. Moreover, had the governments understood the externalities problem, they may have been more ready at the outset to reward the afflicted producers for lessening the probability of infesting the farms of others. But the West African governments did not understand this aspect of the problem and they refused compensation; as one Nigerian official put it, why pay compensation when "the farmers are receiving the cutting out services for free."[16] (quoted in Beer, p. 55). Instead, using their legal powers, the Instead, using their legal powers, the governments simply coerced the farmers. Government agents would move from one farm to the next. Locating diseased trees, they would mark the farm. Then the work gangs would arrive, and, in the words of one farmer, "The farms became a plane field within an hour. . . ."[17] In the Gold Coast, the cutting out program began in January 1947; by 1948 over 600,000 trees had been removed from over 2,500 acres;[18] and in that year, the farmers rose against the government's program. Protesting cutting out, they joined in the 1948 disturbances that led to basic constitutional reforms in the colony. Mobilized in large part through the issue of disease control, they joined the political coalition that brought an end to British rule in that colony.[19]

It arises, for example, under conditions of common property. Collective rights in grazing land promote mismanagement of land resources.

Under conditions of collective grazing rights, if one producer restricts his herd size to a level that is socially optimal, given the carrying capacity of the land, he simply confers a benefit upon the other producers who share in the rights to graze livestock on that land. The result is that private incentives fail to produce the correct choice of herd size, and,in the absence of government intervention, the lands are overgrazed. Attempts by the government to reduce herd sizes led, however, to clashes between the government's vision of the public good and the producers' perception of their own best interest. Destocking often became an issue that led to the mobilization of the arid land farmers against the colonial governments.[20]

Collective rights to fisheries also led to the politicization of rural populations. Thus, in Zambia, conflicts between the fishermen and the government which imposed regulations in an attempt to prevent the depletion of the Lake Mweru fishery -- controls over net sizes, fishing during the spawning season, etc. -- furnished a basis for incorporating the Luapula fisheries into the nationalist movement.[21]

Externalities also arose in the establishment of quality standards. The purchasers of many of the export crops of Africa were willing to offer only one price -- one that reflected their appraisal of the average quality of the crop. Insofar as it was cheaper to produce a low quality product, each farmer was better off marketing a low quality of output while being paid the price for an average quality product. But when all farmers

behaved in this way, then the average quality of output declined. The rational behavior of each farmer thus imposed costs on all farmers in the form of a lowering of the market price. In the absence of a willingness on the part of purchasers to offer a spectrum of prices for a variety of quality standards, the governments in cash crop growing areas therefore felt compelled to intervene and to maintain by administrative methods a high standard of marketed output. The result, once again, was conflict between cash crop producers and the government.[22]

The colonial governments' attempts to promote soil conservation, control crop diseases, and increase the quality of production thus led to increasing state intervention in the agricultural industries of Africa. In the absence of mechanisms that would secure voluntary compliance with rules that would maximize the profits of the producers as a whole, the colonial governments felt compelled to administratively constrain the behavior of African farmers. Under the impact of government regulation, producers who generated negative externalities experienced a decline in their private profits. They resented being coerced into accepting a lower level of economic reward. And they therefore were willing to turn against the colonial governments and to back the efforts of nationalist politicians to overthrow the colonial regimes.[23]

V. THE STRUCTURE OF LAND RIGHTS

With the prospects of profits from agriculture came an increase in the value of land. The allocation of these gains among competing claimants was largely determined by the allocation of land rights, and the ultimate adjudicator of that allocation was the state. Control over the state and its legal system was therefore sought by those seeking to gain economic benefits from commercial farming.

Struggles between indigenous peoples and highly capitalized foreign immigrants constituted one set of such disputes. Thus, for example, in Kenya, the colonial administration won a ruling from the legal officers of the crown that all waste and unoccupied land in the colony was crown land; the colonial government was the legal agent of the crown in the East African Protectorate, and it therefore became the legal owner of "waste and unoccupied" lands in that area. Both the indigenous human and livestock populations had declined precipitately as a result of famines and pestilence in the 1870s; and as indigenous agricultural technology depended in any case on long and extensive land rotations, much of the land in Kenya appeared to be waste or unoccupied. Employing the legal ruling as a basis for determining land rights thus transferred legal rights over vast acreages from the indigenous farm families to the colonial administration. And the administration rapidly transferred its rights to immigrant commercial farmers. Protests over the loss of land rights subsequently formed the basis for much of the nationalist movement in Kenya.[24]

In Ghana, disputes between the farmers and the state over rights to "waste" lands also gave rise to popular movements of political protest against the colonial order. In a series of ordinances, the Government of the Gold Coast in the late nineteenth century attempted to transfer rights over waste and unoccupied lands to the crown. But the indigenous population, led by the rural

chiefs and the legal and commercial elites of the coastal towns, vigorously opposed this action. They defended the rights of the native population to this resource, and argued that though lands may presently be unexploited, nonetheless rights over them were well defined under the traditional legal system. A major reason for their resistance to the transfer of lands rights to the crown was that both the chiefs and the coastal elites had begun to profit from the exercise of their land rights. An active market in land and in concessions for its use had begun in the Gold Coast -- a market that allowed the chiefs and the coastal elites to share in the economic benefits deriving from control over this valuable input into commercial cash crop production.[25] To promote their resistance to the alienation of lands to foreign control, the chiefs and the coastal elites formed the Aborigenes Rights Protection Association -- the first nationalist political party in West Africa.

Disputes over the control of land also arose in the Congo, where the Belgian government gave large scale concessions to foreign capitalists.[26] They also arose in Tanzania, Zambia, Rhodesia, and South Africa, where foreign settlers, backed by the colonial state, appropriated large acreages. In almost every area in Africa, these disputes formed a prominent basis for rural resistance to colonial rule in the continent.[27]

It should also be noted that disputes over land rights led to splits within the indigenous community, and the way in which these political cleavages formed in any African territory gave a special character to the nationalist movement of that area. One of the major characteristics of the nationalist movement in several territories, for example, was that it sought as much to depose the indigenous political elites, the chiefs, as it sought to displace the foreign administration; and where such movements arose, they often did so in areas where the chiefs and the peasants were at odds over land rights. In the Gold Coast, for example, where there were waste and unoccupied lands, they remained stool lands. That is, they remained the lands of the community and rights to these lands could only be alienated by the administrative head of that community, the chief, who was said to occupy the stool or throne. With the rise of the demand for cash crops from Africa, there then arose a demand for rights to land; and the chiefs, in conformity with their traditional role, sold rights to the stool lands. The problem was that rather than diverting the profits from their sale to the communal treasury, the chiefs diverted many of the profits to their private pockets. Increasing indignation over their corruption led to splits between the chiefs and the masses, and these conflicts lent a radical character to much of the nationalist politics of that territory. It also led to major cleavages within the nationalist forces. The chiefs and the commoners, having split over this and other issues, tended to back different factions of the nationalist movement, the chiefs tending to be drawn to the United Gold Coast Convention, while the commoners tended to support the more radical Convention People's Party.[28]

A similar radicalization and polarization emerged in Uganda. In negotiating the final terms of their settlement with the encroaching colonial power, the Kabaka and his subordinate chiefs evoked a recasting of land rights in terms of freehold tenure. Each major chief secured freehold rights over large estates in exchange for acknowledging British sovereignty. The actual occupants of these lands then became tenants of the chiefs. With the growth in the commercial value of these lands -- a growth which principally resulted from the spread of cotton production in Uganda -- the chiefs were able to use their control over land rights to divert revenues from the producers to themselves. They did so by raising the rental fees on the land and by increasing the burden of services required of the tenants. The result was the emergence of a major cleavage between the traditional elites and the peasant farmers -- a split that was only partially healed by the passage of rent control laws.[29]

Other kinds of political cleavages arose in disputes over land rights. Some occurred between communities, as major indigenous communities filed competing claims over lands.[30] Others took the form of conflicts between different levels of government; these too often appeared to be communal in nature. Groups which in the past had conquered others responded to the growing profits to be gained from agriculture by attempting to increase the extent and value of tribute obligations; as these obligations were paid from what amounted to property taxes at the local level, these disputes often arose in the form of disputes converning the allocation of jurisdictions over land.[31] So-called age old disputes between different indigenous communities thus often fundamentally revolved around the allocation of legal rights to this productive resource. And those seeking to benefit economically from the growth of commercial production had good reason to invest in political efforts to seek a favorable determination of rights to land.

One last kind of dispute over land rights is of interest -- conflicts over collective as opposed to individual forms of tenure. Collective rights assure access to land, or to the profits to be realized from its use in commercial agriculture, to all members of a community. In insuring everyone access to these benefits, however, such rights also reduce the ability of entrepreneurs to secure maximum returns from commercial agriculture. Collective rights increase the costs of securing credit; and they curtail the incentive of producers to invest in improvements which would increase the productivity of the land. Those who sought to maximize their private advantage in the emerging agricultural industries of Africa therefore sought private rights in land; those who were more concerned with securing guaranteed access to a subsistence level of production favored the establishment of collective rights. This conflict appears to have been most frequently joined in East Africa. In Uganda, for example, it took the form of the militant reassertion of traditional clan rights over the lands that had been alienated to the chiefs under freehold tenure. The dedication to clan rights formed much of the basis of the Bataka Association -- a movement of the farmers and the

clan heads who opposed the power of the chiefs in general and their private rights over the mailo lands in particular.[32] Analogous disputes broke out among the Kikuyu. Prosperous farmers sought to advance their claims to individual tenure, which others sought to emphasize collective rights to mbari lands out of fear of losing their rights to land in the Kikuyu reserves.[33] The assertion of private rights over collective property by the chiefs of the Gold Coast underlay much of the rural politics in that area. And in the contemporary period, the attempts by the state in Tanzania to promote collective rights to land in the cash cropping regions of that territory has apparently found favor among the rural poor, who fear the loss of land rights in the countryside, while meeting with resistance on the part of the prosperous farmers, who naturally see such measures as threatening the gains which they seek to secure through cash crop production.[34]

VI. TAXATION

There is a last set of issues which arose in conjunction with the commercialization of agriculture: those which revolved around taxation. As is well known, taxation was repeatedly used by public policy makers to induce subsistence farmers to exchange produce or labor for cash; as such, its introduction met with resistance by African rural dwellers. More relevant to this chapter, however, was the behavior of the farmers once they had begun to produce for the market. For a variety of reasons, they continued to engage in political protest against the levying of taxes.

Leaving out of consideration for the moment the properties of public goods, we can view the payment of taxes as an exchange. The private citizen relinquishes the power to purchase a basket of commodities provided in the private marketplace in exchange for a collection of public goods and services provided by the state. In making this exchange, the rural dwellers in Africa have repeatedly protested that the rate of exchange was unfavorable, and that the goods and services received from the state failed to equal in value the private commodities forsaken due to the payment of taxes.

One example of this reaction arose in the early tax rebellions of the 1850s. In the Gold Coast, for example, the colonial administration had convened a series of local assemblies to announce that in order to provide a variety of services -- roads, schools, and hospitals, for example -- the government would be imposing a capitation tax. For a brief period, the tax was successfully collected; but then resistance broke out. Opposition grew to the point of large scale rebellion and no serious attempt was made to collect the tax after 1852. Upon investigating the resistance to taxes, the colonial administration determined that "only about one-fifth the amount collected. . .had been spent on the objects for which it was given."[35] A major grievance was that "the stipends and expenses of collection swallowed up nearly the whole revenue, and the people became restless at the failure to provide the promised benefits."[36] The people protested taxes

because they felt that the taxes made them worse off; the loss in income which they suffered from taxation had not been compensated for by public services of comparable value. So strong were their feelings on the matter, ans so successfully did they act upon them, that the Gold Coast government was unable to impose direct taxes until 1943.

A second major source of grievance over the collection of taxes often fed into and exacerbated the split between the chiefs and the masses that arose with respect to land rights. In the absence of an ability to provide satisfactory services, the colonial government's exercise of its power of taxation in the country-side led to a redistribution of income between the tax-paying peasantry and the holders of public office. Protests over taxation thus frequently became protests against rural office holders, the most prominent of whom were the chiefs. Kilson's analysis of the rural basis of the nationalist movement in Sierra Leone emphasizes these dynamics.[37] So too do many of the studies of rural protest in Ghana. Thus Tordoff notes that with the commercialization of agriculture in the inland areas of the Gold Coast, the chiefs used their powers of taxation to build up the public treasury; the funds of the Native Authorities were supposed to be used to provide public goods, but the rural public authorities largely failed to supply these amenities. The result was that "the number of destoolments increased rapidly and underlined the basic insecurity of the chief's tenure of office. Malcontents were quick to seize the opportunity of accusing their ruler of misappropriating stool money, and the failure of most chiefs to keep proper accounts made this charge difficult to rebut."[38] In his analysis of the changing role of the chief in the Gold Coast, Busia makes a similar point and provides data on local government finances which help to substantiate the argument. Busia's data show that during the early to mid-1940s over eighty percent of the expenditures of the Native authorities were for "administrative expenses," i.e., for salaries, by and large, and less than twenty percent for education, medical services, capital works, and other improvements.[39] Because of the failure to provide services, the payment of taxes thus appeared to involve not a creation of public benefits but rather a redistribution of income between cash crop producers and those who drew their incomes from the state; and naturally, the rural producers resented this transfer.[40]

Two other features of the taxation of cash crop producers generated political protest in colonial Africa. One is the inherent nature of public goods. In the case of public goods and services, such as roads or law and order, it is reasonable for citizens to misrepresent the value they place on them and to protest that they are being charged too much for them. Being public goods, the goods provided by the state will be available for consumption by the taxpayer irrespective of the amount he actually pays for them. The taxpayer would in fact do best by letting others pay for the public goods, which he could then consume for free. The African cash crop

producer, like taxpayers everywhere, were thus simply behaving in a way that maximized their own private welfare when they denigrated the value of the services which they received from the government as being of too low a quantity or quality and when they condemned as excessive the level of taxation which they are asked to pay for these services. Political protest and taxation simply go together.

Secondly, the power of taxation is the power to coerce, and this power can be used to redistribute income. Redistribution makes some people better off by making some people worse off; and the latter group will of course not voluntarily consent to redistributive measures. When taxes are used in this way, they therefore lead to political protest, be it rural Africa or anywhere else.

This pattern is clearly revealed in the political conflicts between small-scale subsistence and large-scale commercial farmers in Kenya and in the emergence of anti-colonial politics in that country. The commodities boom of the early twenties increased the commercial farmers' demand for labor. The government's recruitment of laborers for railway construction, the lingering effects of the loss of population in World War I, and the loss of population in the postwar outbreaks of influenza — all had reduced the labor supply. The commercial producers were unwilling to increase the level of wages which they paid and they therefore experienced a shortage of labor. In response to this shortage, they championed an increase in the level of taxes on subsistence farm families as a means of redistributing labor power from the subsistence to the commercial farm sector. In 1920, the government raised the tax rate; because of a change in the budget year, the new tax was collected twice in a single calendar year. Largely in response to this tax, Harry Thuku organized the first African political party in Kenya: the Young Kikuyu Association.[41]

It was not only labor that was forcefully redeployed between the two farming sectors. The costs of providing services were concentrated in one sector; the benefits from consuming them were reaped by the other. Thus, for example, in 1920, the colonial government of Kenya passed an income tax and the commercial farmers resisted it. Forming a Taxpayers Protection League, they opposed the measure in the legislative council and organized the withholding of tax payments. Finally, in May of 1922, they secured the repeal of the income tax and secured as well passage of a substitute financial measure: a schedule of customs rates which was designed to generate revenue by imposing duties on items consumed in large part by the native population and to provide protection for the commodities produced by the commercial farmers.[42]

The power of taxation was thus used in Kenya to facilitate the redistribution of resources between different sectors of the farming community; and much of the politics of that area centered around efforts to alter the structure of taxes and the allocation of the services which they financed. Similar patterns obtained in West Africa. Thus, for example, one of the main reasons for the taxpayers revolt in mid-nineteenth century Ghana was that the rural

communities perceived that the fisc was being used to redeploy resources among different sections of the population. Explaining their resistance to taxes to which they had formerly assented, Kimble notes:

> The original Assemblies had thought that they were taxing themselves for purely local purposes, and the Accras, for example, "never could have conceived that their money was being applied in making roads and supplying medical aid for Fantees."[43]

The Accras therefore joined the tax rebellion.

The redistributive nature of taxation emerged in another form, and it too promoted political unrest. Through public financial institutions, groups can achieve particular benefits while transferring the costs of supplying them to the political community as a whole. As each group can potentially secure all the benefits of a particular measure while paying only part of the costs, each group will therefore demand that the political community provide those services in which it has a particular interest, even though the total benefits of the measure are outweighed by the total costs. The result is an over-supply of public services. This dynamic appeared to underlie a series of financial crises which beset rural political institutions in Africa. I refer to the fiscal crises that bedeviled the native authorities of midcentury Ghana.

As we have discussed, the rise of cocoa production in the Gold Coast increased the tax base of the rural chieftancies. Through rents, tributes, special levies, and the sale of land, the chieftancies strengthened their finances by transferring funds from the cocoa farmers to themselves. The rise of cocoa farming also increased the demand for services from the chieftancies, and in particular, the demand for secure rights in land. The cocoa farmers obtained their farm lands by purchasing land rights from the chiefs; and where the jurisdiction of the chiefs was uncertain, it was in the interest of the farmers to demonstrate through a court of law the jurisdictional primacy of the chief that had sold them their lands. The disputes between the cocoa farmers thus became disputes between different local chieftaincies.

With the increased density of farms in the cocoa producing forest lands, the numbers of conflicting land claims multiplied; the cocoa farmers therefore had more frequent occasion to seek clarification of their chiefs' jurisdictions. The costs of these disputes were borne by all of the taxpayers who fell under the jurisdiction of the chief; the benefits were reaped by a particular group of farmers. The result of these factors was apparently to increase further the volume of litigation, both by raising the likelihood of disputes being pushed that had a low probability of winning and by increasing the number of appeals against adverse rulings. It was therefore not surprising that the costs of litigation rose to an alarming degree in the cocoa farming areas, and in fact imposed a major fiscal burden upon native authorities throughout the area.[44] Much of the political unrest in the cash cropping areas of the Gold Coast reflected dissatisfaction with the mounting stool debts and the apparent mismanagement of public finances by local governments.

The rising stool debts, and the attempts to remove them through general levies, represented a transfer of resources to the farmers -- who would benefit from the establishment of their rights to the full capital value of their lands -- from present and future taxpayers -- who would have to pay the costs of litigation involved in establishing their chiefs' jurisdiction over these lands. Farmers, however, were not always the primary beneficiaries of the redistribution of resources through fiscal measures; indeed, they have increasingly become the victims of such measures. And this has become increasingly true as ambitious political elites have sought to secure for public purposes the private resources being amassed by those making profits from commercial agriculture. The result has been political protest -- protest mounted by the farmers against those who sought to use the state to deprive them of their earnings.

Political events in Ghana best illustrate this argument. In June 1954 Ghana became self-governing. The nationalist government sought to realize the ambitions that had fueled its attempts to wrest power from the hands of foreigners by mounting a major development program -- a program which would not only bring greater prosperity to the country as a whole but which also through the diversification of the economy, would reduce the country's vulnerability to fluctuations in the price of cocoa. In August 1954 the government therefore enacted the Cocoa Duty and Development Funds (Amendment) Bill -- a measure to freeze the producer price of cocoa for four years and to increase the rate of progression of the cocoa duty.

The effect of the first feature of this legislation was to hold steady the price paid to the farmers while allowing the Marketing Board, which purchased the crop from the farmers and sold it abroad, to sell at whatever price prevailed in the world market. As in the past, the Board would accumulate the difference between the two prices; but at a time when people expected the world price to rise, the effect of fixing local prices at the level proposed by the government appeared to be the appropriation by the government of an increasing percentage of the earnings of the cocoa farmers

The effect of the second feature of the 1954 legislation was to redistribute funds from the Marketing Board to the government itself. The trading surpluses of the Marketing Board were often used for purposes that little benefitted the farmer. The high salaries it paid its officials, and its inflated costs of marketing, represented transfers from the farmers to the directors and managers of the state agency. Many of its trading surpluses were invested in low bearing treasury notes, and so were in effect used to provide a subsidized loan from the farmers to the government. The trading surpluses also financed a price-stabilizing fund; but this was rarely employed to shelter the farmers from slumps in the cocoa price. Nonetheless, by law, the trading surpluses were at least <u>supposed</u> to be used to benefit the farmers. And by employing these funds to investigate cocoa diseases and to control their spread, to rehabilitate cocoa farms, to conduct research on behalf of the cocoa industry, and to provide scholarships for the children of cocoa farmers, the Marketing Board did in fact use a portion of its

trading surpluses to provide benefits to the cocoa farmers. By increasing the cocoa duty, however, the government sought, for any pair of producer and sales prices, to reduce the amount of surplus accruing to the Marketing Board. It therefore sought to divert the funds from an agency mandated to use its trading surplus on behalf of the cocoa industry to the government -- an agency whose constituency included all sectors of the economy and whose mandate was to bring prosperity not to the cocoa industry but to the nation as a whole.

The cocoa farmers reacted vigorously to the passage of the legislation. Most of the farmers resided in the Ashanti area; organized by dissenting politicians, many vigorously backed the development of a regionalist political movement, named the National Liberation Movement, which called for greater autonomy for Ashanti and for a weakening of the central government's fiscal powers. As Beckman succinctly states:

> From the point of view of Ashanti, the federal issue and the cocoa price were of course greatly related. Greater regional autonomy would serve to redirect a greater portion of cocoa revenue to its origin.[45]

Ambitious governments have thus designed fiscal measures to accumulate resources out of cash cropping and to use these to finance the development of other sectors. And cash crop producers have vigorously resisted this redistribution. Opposition to publically sponsored monopsonies has characterized the behavior of cash crop producers throughout Africa. Most commonly, it has taken the form of smuggling. Governments, of course, have sought to curtail this activity. And resistance to government efforts to surpress illegal markets has become a muted form of political protest analogous, perhaps, to the resistance to poaching laws in post-feudal Europe. More dramatic, but less frequent, have been open rebellions such as those mounted by the cocoa farmers of Ibadan.[46] The use of taxation to redistribute income from country to town, from agriculture to industry, from farmer to bureaucrat, industrialist, or worker -- the use of the power of the state in this manner is one of the most potent sources of rural political protest in Africa.

VII. CONCLUSION

In this essay, we have examined the relationship between the commercialization of agriculture and the rise of political protest in Africa. We have done so by asking why those who seek profits from the production of agricultural commodities should leave the market-place and enter the political arena. We have seen that several considerations account for this behavior. The structure of the markets which producers confronted in their search for profits provided an incentive to combine. The existence of significant production externalities promoted public intervention in an attempt to secure greater profitability for the industry as a whole. Those who benefitted from these externalities, and those who simply resented the use of coercion on African peasants by a foreign power, then turned to politics to alter the government's behavior. The allocation of land rights had a strong bearing on the ultimate allocation of the

benefits produced by the commercialization of agriculture; this allocation was determined by the state; and these considerations also provided a rationale for those seeking profits from agriculture to engage in political action. Lastly, the state influenced the distribution of profits from cash cropping through its use of the power to levy taxes. Through political action, African cash crop producers sought to alter the structure of taxes and the allocation of the benefits which they financed. Increasingly, the political efforts of cash crop producers have focused on attempts to prevent the confiscation of their earnings by the state and their redeployment to other sectors. Sporadic resistance against market controls, tax-payers rebellions, and movements in support of regional autonomy -- all constitute attempts by rural dwellers to use coercion to safeguard the profits which they seek to realize from the commercial production of agricultural products.

TABLE 1. EXPORTS OF PALM OIL, PALM KERNEL OIL, AND PALM KERNELS

(Thousand metric tons)

DATE	ZAIRE Palm Oil	ZAIRE Palm Kernel Oil	ZAIRE Palm Kernels	FRENCH WEST AFRICA Palm Oil	FRENCH WEST AFRICA Palm Kernel Oil	FRENCH WEST AFRICA Palm Kernels	NIGERIA Palm Oil	NIGERIA Palm Kernels	SIERRA LEONE Palm Oil	SIERRA LEONE Palm Kernels
1909	1.7	...	5.2		...		83.4	161.4	3.5	43.6
10	2.2	...	6.1	19.1	...		78.1	175.8	2.7	43.7
11	2.3	...	6.8	17.3	...	46.3	80.6	179.2	3.0	43.6
12	2.0	...	5.9		...	44.3	78.2	187.6	3.0	51.6
13	2.0	...	7.2		...		84.4	177.5	2.5	50.0
14	2.5	...	8.1		...		73.7	165.1	1.8	36.5
15	3.4	...	11.0		...		74.2	155.8	2.0	40.3
16	3.9	...	22.4		...		68.5	164.0	2.3	46.0
17	5.4	...	35.0	19.9	...	50.9	75.8	189.0	2.2	59.0
18	5.1	...	31.4		...		87.8	208.5	1.1	41.5
19	8.0	...	37.3		...		102.6	220.4	3.4	51.4
20	7.6	...	39.5		...		86.2	210.3	2.1	51.2
21	9.0	...	46.0		...		53.6	155.8	0.2	41.1
22	10.7	...	49.3	19.4	...	55.9	89.0	181.6	2.1	49.8
23	12.4	...	54.6		...		101.0	226.8	3.4	60.5
24	14.1	...	47.5	25.8	...	72.1	126.0	256.6	3.2	62.1
25	18.7	...	74.1	26.0	...	73.3	130.2	277.3	3.0	64.2
26	18.5	...	70.4	25.4	...	70.2	115.1	253.1	2.9	66.0
27	18.4	...	74.0	25.9	...	74.5	115.1	261.3	3.7	66.5
28	26.5	...	72.5	17.4	...	59.5	128.1	249.1	2.6	68.2
29	30.3	...	75.4	22.9	...	62.4	132.9	254.1	2.9	61.2
30	37.0	...	66.4	22.5	...	78.4	136.8	262.8	3.7	57.6
31	36.6	...	47.2	20.9	...	65.7	118.8	257.4	1.4	55.3
32	38.8	...	57.9	14.6	...	71.0	116.2	312.4	2.2	78.4
33	52.5	...	62.1	12.1	...	53.5	128.9	262.5	1.6	65.1
34	45.0	...	49.3	15.4	...	76.6	113.1	292.8	2.3	69.8
35	56.8	-	65.0	26.5	...	80.7	143.2	316.3	2.9	79.3
36	60.0	-	92.4	29.2	...	98.5	163.7	390.8	1.2	85.9
37	69.1	-	95.6	20.1	...	81.5	146.2	341.6	2.4	78.0
38	70.3	-	88.7	13.7	...	70.3	110.4	315.6	1.4	64.7
39	72.5	0.1	84.8	13.4	...	55.2	128.1	304.8	1.2	70.9

TABLE 1. EXPORTS OF PALM OIL, PALM KERNEL OIL, AND PALM KERNELS (cont'd)

(Thousand metric tons)

DATE	ZAIRE				FRENCH WEST AFRICA			NIGERIA		SIERRA LEONE	
		Palm Kernels & Palm Kernel Oil									
	Palm Oil	Oil	Kernels	Oil & Kernels	Palm Oil	Palm Kernel Oil	Palm Kernels	Palm Oil	Palm Kernels	Palm Oil	Palm Kernels
1940	65.3	0.2	44.9	45.3	11.9	...	51.6	134.9	239.2	1.4	54.1
41	60.3	0.5	30.2	31.1	15.7	...	46.5	129.8	384.2	0.1	37.8
42	79.4	4.8	52.5	63.2	7.8	...	41.7	153.7	350.1	0.3	20.9
43	99.1	6.8	63.2	78.3	7.8	...	50.5	137.4	336.6	-	37.0
44	86.9	5.6	56.9	69.3	10.6	...	50.1	126.8	318.6	-	46.4
45	77.9	7.8	43.5	60.8	4.8	...	46.3	116.0	298.2	-	48.1
46	88.1	9.4	48.9	69.8	0.7	...	35.4	102.5	281.7	0.1	47.5
47	84.9	11.1	48.1	72.8	0.7	...	40.0	128.0	321.5	0.6	64.0
48	110.4	17.6	83.4	121.7	10.8	-	63.3	141.5	332.4	2.2	67.5
49	117.8	12.2	80.0	106.5	9.8	-	85.5	172.9	381.9	3.4	77.8
50	125.0	12.8	85.8	113.6	11.2	0.6	84.5 85.8	175.8	416.8	2.0	72.4
51	128.1	17.2	86.2	123.6	14.5	-	75.3	152.1	352.6	3.2	76.3
52	137.5	11.2	92.5	116.8	9.5	0.4	64.2 65.0	170.0	380.2	0.8	77.6
53	131.8	15.0	87.6	120.2	16.3	-	85.7	203.9	406.6	0.4	70.0
54	136.8	24.3	71.3	124.1	14.4	-	81.3	211.8	471.6	0.9	69.2
55	149.0	34.6	62.8	138.0	18.3	-	63.5	185.1	440.2	...	58.6

Source: K.R.M. Anthony, Bruce F. Johnston, William O. Jones, Victor C. Uchendu, Agricultural Change in Tropical Africa, Cornell University Press, Forthcoming 1978.

... Not available

\- None at all

TABLE 2. COCOA EXPORTS

(Thousand metric tons)

YEAR	CAMEROON	FRENCH WEST AFRICA	GHANA	NIGERIA
1909	3.3	-	20.5	2.3
10	3.4	-	23.0	3.0
11	3.6	-	40.4	4.5
12	4.6	-	39.3	3.4
13	4.5	0.1	51.4	3.7
14	3.2	-	53.7	5.0
15	3.4	0.1	78.5	9.2
16	0.8	0.2	73.3	9.1
17	1.1	0.3	97.4	15.7
18	0.7	0.4	67.4	10.4
19	2.3	1.0	107.0	26.1
1920	2.6	1.0	126.8	17.4
21	3.3	1.5	135.3	18.2
22	3.5	2.4	161.9	31.8
23	3.5	3.6	200.8	33.3
24	4.5	4.3	226.9	37.8
25	4.9	6.3	221.6	45.4
26	5.4	6.9	234.5	39.7
27	7.6	9.8	213.3	39.8
28	7.3	16.5	228.7	46.3
29	10.0	16.5	241.9	53.1
1930	10.6	22.3	193.6	50.2
31	10.9	19.9	248.0	50.6
32	13.8	25.8	237.5	28.8
33	17.2	31.1	239.9	58.0
34	19.5	41.6	234.0	74.6
35	23.4	43.6	273.2	85.4
36	23.8	49.8	316.1	77.0
37	26.6	48.1	240.0	100.0
38	31.0	52.7	267.4	94.8
39	27.6	55.2	285.2	115.7

TABLE 2. COCOA EXPORTS (cont'd.)

(Thousand metric tons)

YEAR	CAMEROON	FRENCH WEST AFRICA	GHANA	NIGERIA
1940	24.4	45.5	227.5	91.2
41	20.4	43.0	222.4	106.4
42	15.0	28.6	125.9	60.9
43	32.4	0.5	190.4	88.9
44	35.1	14.7	206.1	71.2
45	34.8	26.9	236.0	78.2
46	34.0	28.4	240.0	101.8
47	33.7	28.1	183.1	112.6
48	47.9	41.2	217.7	92.9
49	48.0	56.1	267.8	118.0
1950	43.7	61.8	271.7	92.9
51	48.8	55.5	233.2	123.4
52	51.1	50.2	215.4	116.6
53	60.5	71.7	240.4	106.3
54	50.0	52.7	217.6	100.0
55	55.6	75.2	209.2	89.8

Source: See source Table I.

TABLE 3. COTTON EXPORTS

(Thousand metric tons)

YEAR	ZAIRE	FRENCH EQUITORIAL AFRICA	UGANDA	MOZAMBIQUE	NIGERIA	SUDAN	TANZANIA
1909	-	-	...	-	2.3	...	0.5
10	-	-	-	-	1.1	...	0.5
11	-	-	3.0	-	1.0	...	1.1
12	-	-	3.9	-	2.0	...	1.9
13	-	-	4.3	-	2.9	...	2.2
14	-	-	5.4	-	2.6	...	...
15	-	-	4.6	-	1.2	...	...
16	-	-	3.9	-	3.4	3.5	...
17	-	-	5.0	-	2.4	2.6	...
18	-	-	5.0	-	0.7	2.2	...
19	0.2	-	...	-	3.1	4.3	...
1920	0.2	-	9.5	-	3.3	3.5	1.0
21	0.2	-	14.8	0.2	5.8	5.0	1.1
22	1.0	-	8.8	0.2	3.0	4.4	1.6
23	...	-	16.0	0.3	3.2	5.1	1.5
24	...	-	23.3	0.4	4.7	8.4	2.6
25	1.3	-	35.6	1.4	6.7	7.8	4.6
26	2.2	-	32.8	2.0	9.1	22.2	5.0
27	5.2	-	23.9	1.3	5.1	28.9	4.0
28	7.5	0.1	25.1	1.2	3.8	23.5	5.0
29	9.6	0.2	37.0	1.6	6.0	30.5	5.0
1930	10.0	0.8	23.4	1.7	8.1	27.8	3.7
31	12.5	0.9	34.3	1.5	3.6	9.0	2.5
32	12.1	1.6	37.6	1.8	1.2	38.2	3.3
33	12.8	2.4	53.5	2.3	4.5	24.4	5.2
34	20.0	5.1	51.8	2.0	6.0	33.0	5.7
35	23.5	6.2	45.9	2.9	11.0	37.7	10.1
36	26.5	6.7	58.3	4.8	11.3	48.0	11.4
37	32.3	8.4	61.4	8.4	9.7	70.4	11.7
38	42.0	9.9	73.0	8.9	5.8	62.3	9.0
39	35.5	8.8	59.8	6.6	4.4	61.7	11.8

TABLE 3. COTTON EXPORTS (cont'd.)

(Thousand metric tons)

YEAR	ZAIRE	FRENCH EQUITORIAL AFRICA	UGANDA	MOZAMBIQUE	NIGERIA	SUDAN	TANZANIA
1940	23.0	8.8	55.1	5.2	9.5	37.6	10.8
41	25.7	17.7	66.4	6.6	10.4	84.2	13.3
42	32.3	17.5	42.9	14.3	18.8	50.8	8.1
43	41.3	10.0	22.3	15.4	7.3	9.5	7.1
44	30.0	17.5	34.3	23.9	4.4	22.7	6.0
45	38.3	20.0	48.0	14.3	1.1	73.8	7.3
46	48.0	24.8	39.8	10.9	6.7	52.9	4.3
47	45.1	21.1	45.9	5.9	5.3	52.7	7.2
48	51.2	32.3	31.6	26.0	4.7	50.8	6.8
49	46.8	23.6	70.8	28.1	10.1	65.2	11.0
1950	49.0	24.0	63.2	24.4	12.8	66.5	7.2
51	39.8	27.0	62.8	24.1	15.6	95.5	8.4
52	45.7	29.4	68.5	30.1	19.6	55.2	11.3
53	45.6	25.0	60.8	38.3	18.0	90.2	15.0
54	40.7	31.7	71.4	38.3	26.4	60.4	12.3
55	40.0	33.0	55.6	32.8	33.7	94.7	20.7

Source: See source Table I.

... Not available

\- None at all

TABLE 4. COFFEE EXPORTS

(Thousand metric tons)

YEAR	ANGOLA	ZAIRE	CAMEROON	ETHIOPIA	IVORY COAST	KENYA	UGANDA	TANZANIA
1909	4.4	–	–		–	0.4	–	...
10	6.1	–	–		–	0.6	–	1.0
11	4.4	–	–	3.2	–	0.7	0.1	1.2
12	4.0	–	–		–	1.0	0.2	1.2
13	4.8	–	–	3.1	–	1.3	0.6	1.1
14	4.4	–	–	3.4	–	1.5	1.1	...
15	4.0	–	–	4.7	–	1.1	2.2	...
16	3.2	–	–	4.2	–	4.4	2.6	...
17	4.1	–	–	3.1	–	5.0	1.0	...
18	4.2	0.1	–	3.1	–	8.5	4.5	...
19	6.2	0.2	–	4.6	–	6.2	3.0	4.0
1920	3.9	0.1	–	3.1	–	8.0	3.7	–
21	5.1	–	–	4.1	–	–	2.5	3.8
22	9.8	0.2	–	6.6	–	6.6	2.6	4.3
23	6.0	0.1	–	5.6	0.1	9.4	2.1	4.1
24	8.9	0.4	–	11.1	–	10.1	2.1	5.3
25	12.6	0.2	–	10.4	–	7.5	1.5	6.1
26	9.3	0.2	–	11.5	0.1	7.2	1.7	6.6
27	10.0	0.3	–	14.0	0.2	10.7	2.2	6.7
28	9.8	0.6	–	...	0.2	10.8	2.0	10.6
29	8.8	0.8	–	...	0.4	6.8	2.1	9.0
1930	11.8	1.5	–	14.1	0.5	15.8	2.5	11.7
31	11.8	2.9	–	18.1	0.7	12.5	3.6	9.4
32	9.5	5.4	0.1	11.1	1.4	14.0	4.4	11.5
33	12.0	8.5	0.5	12.5	1.8	13.1	5.1	12.9
34	11.7	12.4	0.8	17.2	2.7	9.5	7.8	15.0
35	10.3	13.2	1.4	15.2	5.3	18.2	6.4	18.9
36	19.6	16.8	2.0	8.7	6.7	20.8	11.6	12.3
37	16.4	16.0	2.6	9.0	10.4	13.9	13.1	13.8
38	17.5	19.1	4.2	...	14.5	17.4	14.2	14.0
39	20.7	19.7	5.3	...	18.6	17.2	17.4	16.9

TABLE 4. COFFEE EXPORTS (cont'd.)

(Thousand metric tons)

YEAR	ANGOLA	ZAIRE	CAMEROON	ETHIOPIA	IVORY COAST	KENYA	UGANDA	TANZANIA
1940	15.8	13.2	4.2		17.1	8.7	18.2	15.9
41	14.2	18.3	0.1		29.0	12.6	20.6	13.9
42	19.5	19.7	6.6	12.0	20.0	12.5	17.5	15.1
43	23.9	22.4	8.6		23.0	7.9	20.5	11.1
44	23.8	14.9	5.1		24.5	7.6	19.4	15.8
45	30.9	24.3	6.7	10.0	39.2	7.6	20.6	14.7
46	44.3	26.8	5.9	15.9	36.4	9.7	31.9	10.2
47	40.6	37.3	5.6	14.9	44.1	10.8	21.4	14.1
48	53.4	30.5	7.3	15.3	56.3	14.5	38.4	11.4
49	46.4	31.4	8.2	22.4	63.7	7.9	24.3	12.4
1950	37.6	32.7	7.7	18.7	57.7	10.4	32.4	15.2
51	64.4	34.5	8.7	30.3	62.9	10.1	44.3	16.8
52	47.7	30.3	9.2	21.4	71.4	17.0	40.1	18.9
53	71.6	33.5	9.6	43.1	56.4	15.0	36.3	15.5
54	44.2	35.4	11.4	37.2	94.9	10.9	35.2	19.7
55	57.9	43.7	13.9	41.8	85.8	19.7	75.6	18.8

Source: See source Table I.

... Not available

\- None at all

TABLE 5. EXPORTS OF PEANUTS AND PEANUT OIL IN SHELLED NUT EQUIVALENT

(Thousand metric tons)

YEAR	IVORY COAST	GAMBIA	NIGERIA	SUDAN
1909	102.0	38.2	1.6	0.2
10	...	41.6	1.0	0.6
11	...	34.1	1.3	0.8
12	157.7	45.6	2.6	0.6
13	...	48.0	19.6	0.5
14	...	47.6	17.3	0.1
15	...	68.4	9.1	0.4
16	...	33.0	51.2	0.7
17	146.9	52.8	51.1	2.0
18	...	40.2	58.5	1.8
19	...	50.0	40.0	2.4
1920	...	59.8	46.1	2.0
21	...	41.4	51.8	2.9
22	207.8	44.8	24.3	1.9
23	...	44.5	23.3	4.2
24	...	43.1	79.5	7.3
25	317.6	34.6	129.3	8.3
26	343.9	43.4	128.8	6.9
27	288.3	48.4	92.2	1.1
28	304.7	54.6	104.8	1.3
29	312.5	41.3	149.7	2.6
1930	381.5	53.2	148.7	3.4
31	325.4	68.5	162.3	2.0
32	139.2	26.5	191.1	0.9
33	274.7	47.9	207.9	2.2
34	395.8	51.2	248.8	5.0
35	306.2	32.1	187.0	3.1
36	418.2	35.3	221.9	3.0
37	556.3	47.8	331.2	4.8
38	441.8	33.7	183.0	4.1
39	526.9	35.4	149.6	2.9

TABLE 5. EXPORTS OF PEANUTS AND PEANUT OIL IN SHELLED NUT EQUIVALENT (cont'd.)

(Thousand metric tons)

YEAR	IVORY COAST	GAMBIA	NIGERIA	SUDAN
1940	372.9	30.7	172.2	5.7
41	425.5	31.4	251.1	2.7
42	107.1	12.0	197.3	1.8
43	56.9	14.1	144.8	-
44	191.0	21.3	156.7	-
45	172.1	30.7	179.1	-
46	248.8	28.8	290.3	-
47	275.6	40.0	260.0	-
48	357.0	49.7	249.9	-
49	339.2	43.6	385.3	9.1
1950	367.4	41.8	330.2	3.3
51	307.4	39.9	153.1	10.0
52	334.3	43.3	288.1	17.4
53	446.5	36.3	376.1	26.7
54	479.7	37.5	507.1	16.5
55	372.7	40.0	482.8	34.9

Source: See source Table I.

... Not available

\- None at all

FOOTNOTES

1. Charles Wilson, The History of Unilever, Volumes I, II, and III (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968).

2. Board of Trade, Memorandum on Transport Development and Cotton Growing in East Africa, [Cmd. 2463] (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1925).

3. For discussion of the rise of African exports, see Bruce F. Johnston, "Changes in Agricultural Productivity," In Economic Transition in Africa, Melville J. Herskovits and Mitchell Horwitz, eds. (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1964), pp. 151-178; Jan S. Hogendorn, "Economic Initiative and African Cash Farming: Pre-Colonial Origins and Early Colonial Developments," In Colonialism in Africa 1870-1960, volume 4, the Economics of Colonialism, Peter Guignan and L. H. Gann, eds. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 283-328; Allan McPhee, The Economic Revolution in British West Africa, (London: George Routledge & Sons, 1926); A. G. Hopkins, An Economic History of West Africa, (New York: Columbia University press, 1973); Charles Wilson, The History of Unilever. See also some of the material contained in Richard D. Wolff, The Economics of Colonialism: Britain and Kenya, 1870-1930, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1974).

4. Elena J. Berger, Labour, Race, and Colonial Rule: The Copperbelt from 1924 to Independence, (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1974); Donald George Morrison, Robert Cameron Mitchell, John Naber, and Hugh Michael Stevenson, Black Africa: A Comparative Handbook, (New York: The Free Press, 1972); B. S. Hoyle, and D. Hilling, eds. Seaports and Development in Tropical Africa, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970).

5. In some instances -- and they were important ones -- the production of these commodities was secured at a loss of welfare. The use of coercion in the growing of cotton in French and German Africa [see, for example, G. C. K. Gwassa, and John Iliffe, Records of the Maji Maji Rising, (Dar es Salaam: East African Publishing House, 1967)] and to some degree in British Africa as well, is a case in point, as is the use of forced labor in palm oil production in the Belgian Congo. But in the vast majority of cases, there can be no question but that the penetration of the market into the rural countryside generated new economic opportunities, and the prospects of significant material gain.

6. P. T. Bauer, West African Trade: A Study of Competition, Oligopoly and Monopoly in a Changing Economy, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1963).

7. Josephine Milburn, "The 1938 Gold Coast Crisis: British Business and the Colonial Office," African Historical Studies III, no. 1 (1970), pp. 57-74; United Kingdom Government, Report of the Commission on the Marketing of West African Cocoa, The Nowell Commission, [Cmd. 5845], (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1938).

8. United Kingdom Government, Report of the Commission on the Marketing of West African Cocoa, p. 54.

9. The magnitude of the monopsony rents is suggested in the rapidly rising price of options to purchase licensed gins [G. Andrew Maguire, Toward 'Uhuru' in Tanzania: The Politics of Participation, (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1969), p. 86].

10. Cyril Ehrlich, "The Uganda Economy: 1903-1945," History of East Africa, Harlow, Vincent and E. M. Chilver, eds., Volume II, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), p. 466.

11. G. Andrew Maguire, Toward 'Uhuru' in Tanzania: The Politics of Participation.

12. See Uganda Protectorate, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Disturbances in Uganda During April, 1949, (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1950). It should also be noted that the cooperative unions in fact bought into the cartel. Rather than breaking up the monopsony and securing a competitive market, they simply secured ginning capacity within the structure of the market as mandated by colonial law. The result was that the cooperative societies ended up accumulating monopsony profits on their milling operations from their own cotton growing members. See, for example, Lionel Cliffe and J. S. Saul, "The District Development Front in Tanzania," Socialism in Tanzania, volume 1, Lionel Cliffe and John S. Saul, eds., (Nairobi: East-African Publishing House, 1972), pp. 302-328; John S. Saul, "Marketing Co-operatives in a Developing Country: The Tanzanian Case," Socialism in Tanzania, volume 2, Lionel Cliffe and John S. Saul, eds., (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1973), pp. 141-152.

13. Roland Young and Henry Fosbrooke, Smoke in the Hills: Political Tension in the Morgoro District of Tanzania, (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1960).

14. Lionel R. Cliffe, "Nationalism and the Reaction to Enforced Agricultural Change in Tanganyika During the Colonial Period," Taamuli: A Political Science Forum, volume 1, no 1 (July 1970), pp. 1-15.

15. See materials contained in J. Brian Wills, ed., Agriculture and Land Use in Ghana, (London: Oxford University Press, for the Ghana Ministry of Food and Agriculture, 1962).

16. Christopher Beer, The Politics of Peasant Groups in Western Nigeria, (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1976), p. 55.

17. Ibid., p. 60.

18. Kwamina Busamafi Dickson, Cocoa in Ghana, (Ph.D. dissertation, University of London, 1960), p. 275.

19. Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Disturbances in the Gold Coast 1948 [Colonial No. 321], (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1948).

20. Lionel R. Cliffe, "Nationalism and Reaction to Enforced Agricultural Change"; Peter F. M. McLoughlin, "Agricultural Development in Sukumaland," Experiences with Agricultural Development in Tropical Africa, volume 2, John C. de Wilde, ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967); G. Andrew Maguire,

Toward 'Uhuru' in Tanzania: The Politics of Participation.

21. Robert H. Bates, Rural Responses to Industrialization: A Study of Village Zambia, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1976).

22. See the discussion by P. T. Bauer and B. S. Yamey, "The Economics of Marketing Reform." Journal of Political Economy LXII (1954), pp. 210-235. They argue that there is in fact no problem here, save that of the stupidity of the government; for if there were a demand for a high quality of product, they argue, then the purchasers would offer a premium for it. They are both right and wrong. They are right concerning the acuity of the governments; they are wrong in thinking that the purchaser would offer an appropriate spectrum of prices. For over the period in which the issue of quality control was most prominent, it was in fact the governments themselves who were buying the output of the cash crop producers. This period was the 1940s and, in some instances, the early 1950s, when the colonial governments purchased the full national output under terms of bulk buying agreements. Presumably, following the termination of these agreements, the market established price gradations reflecting the relative value of different qualities of ourput, and the need for public controls to secure high quality declined. This may account for the apparent reduction in the significance of this issue in the rural politics of Africa.

23. It should be noted that factors other than externalities made the imposition of regulations a political issue. The people

did not like being coerced, plain and simple. They did not like the fact that the regulations were often imposed upon them without prior consultation and without soliciting the input of producers in the planning process. Moreover, the regulations were often poorly designed. They were developed on the basis of the average producers and thus often made little sense. For example, imposing the same percentage reduction in herd size on farmers in the lushest grazing areas as on the farmers in arid zones had little justification. The regulations were often insensitive to the interdependence of the production process. Building up herds served as a hedge on the production of good crops, which were periodically threatened by drought, for example; and limiting the production of cattle without adjusting for the increased risks to the farmer lowered his welfare. Lastly, some of the measures were simply destructive; digging bench terracing often brought to the surface sterile soils, and so reduced the productivity of the gardens. For all these reasons, then, in addition to the problems arising from externalities, the regulations were unpopular with the rural dwellers.

24. M. P. K. Sorrenson, Origins of European Settlement in Kenya, (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1968); Carl G. Rosberg, Jr. and John Nottingham, The Myth of "Mau Mau": Nationalism in Kenya, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, for The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, 1966).

25. David Kimble, A Political History of Ghana: The Rise of Gold Coast Nationalism, 1850-1928, (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1963).

26. Jean Stengers, "The Congo Free State and the Belgian Congo before 1914," Colonialism in Africa 1870-1960, volume 1, History and Politics of Colonialism 1870-1914, L. H. Gann and Peter Guignan, eds. (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1969), pp. 261-292.

27. Robert I. Rotberg, "The Rise of African Nationalism: The Case of East and Central Africa," World Politics XV, 1 (October 1962), pp. 75-90.

28. Terence J. Johnson, "An Analysis of Southern Gold Coast Riots 1890-1920," Economy and Society I, no. 2, pp. 164-193; Jarle Simensen, "Rural Mass Action in the Context of Anti-Colonial Protest: The Asafo Movement of Akim Abuakwa, Ghana," Canadian Journal of African Studies, vol. 8, no. 1 (1974), pp. 25-41; Martin L. Kilson, "Nationalism and Social Classes in British West Africa," The Journal of Politics, 20, no. 2 (May 1958), pp. 368-87; K. A. Busia, The Position of the Chief in the Modern Political System of Ashanti, (London: Oxford University Press, for the International African Institute, 1951); Dennis Austin, Politics in Ghana 1946-1960, (London: Oxford University Press, for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1970).

29. R. C. Pratt, "Administration and Politics in Uganda, 1919-1945," History of East Africa, Vincent Harlow and E. M. Chilver, eds., volume II, (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1965); Cyril Ehrlich, "The Uganda Economy: 1903-1945," History of East Africa; C. C. Wrigley, Crops and Wealth in Uganda, A Short Agrarian History, (Nairobi: Oxford University Press on behalf of Makerere Institute of Social Research, 1970).

30. Report of Commission of Inquiry into Expenses incurred by Litigants in the Courts of the Gold Coast and Indebtedness caused thereby, (Accra: Government Printing Department, 1945); H Conway Belfield, Report on the Legislation Governing the Alienation of Native Lands in the Gold Coast Colony and Ashanti; with some observations on the "Forest Ordinance," 1911, [Cd. 6278], (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1912); Polly Hill, The Migrant Cocoa-Farmers of Southern Ghana: A Study in Rural Capitalism, (Cambridge: University Press, 1963). As Busia has noted: "The earlier land disputes settled by Government clearly show the relation between litigation about land and the new industries which enhanced its economic value. Earlier settlements of boundary disputes are tabulated below. [They] indicate . . . that most litigation took place in the mining and cocoa areas in South Ashanti. . . ." K. A. Busia, The Position of the Chief in the Modern Political System of Ashanti, p. 205.

31. One example of this is the struggle between the Ashanti Confederacy Council, which sought to extend its fiscal jurisdiction over outlying areas and so centralize the revenues derived from the commercial utilization of land (John Dunn and A. F. Robertson, Dependence and Opportunity: Political Change in Ahafo, In the African Studies Series (9), J. R. Goody, ed., (Cambridge: University Press, 1973)). Another example would be Nana Ofori Atta's attempt to expand the power of the Omanahene of Akim Abuakwa, and thereby lay hold of the revenues being generated by the richest cocoa lands

of his time. See Polly Hill, The Migrant Cocoa-Farmers of Southern Ghana, p. 148.

32. R. C. Pratt, "Administration and Politics in Uganda."

33. Gretha Kershaw, "The Land is the People: A Study of Kikuyu Social Organization in Historical Perspective," (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1972); M. P. K. Sorrenson, Land Reform in the Kikuyu Country: A Study in Government Policy, (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, for the East African Institute of Social Research, 1967).

34. Lionel Cliffe, "The Policy of Ujamaa Vijijini and the Class Struggle in Tanzania," Socialism in Tanzania, volume 2, Lionel Cliffe and John S. Saul, eds., (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1973), pp. 141-152; John S. Saul, "Class and Penetration in Tanzania," Socialism in Tanzania, volume 1, Lionel Cliffe, and John S. Saul, eds., (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1972), pp. 118-126; John S. Saul, "Marketing Co-operatives in a Developing Country."

35. David Kimble, A Political History of Ghana, p. 182.

36. Ibid. p. 190.

37. Martin L. Kilson, "Grass-Roots Politics in Africa: Local Government in Sierra Leone," Political Studies, XII (February 1964), pp. 47-66; Martin L. Kilson, Political Change in a West African State: A Study of the Modernization Process in Sierra Leone, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966).

38. William Tordoff, Ashanti Under the Prempehs: 1888-1935, (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 192.

39. K. A. Busia, The Position of the Chief in the Modern Political System of Ashanti, p. 165.

40. See also Jarle Simensen, "Rural Mass Action in the Context of Anti-Colonial Protest.

41. W. McGregor Ross, Kenya From Within: A Short Political History, (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1927), p. 153.

42. Ibid. p. 154.

43. David Kimble, A Political History of Ghana, p. 182.

44. See H. Conway Belfield, Report on the Legislation Governing the Alienation of Native Lands; Report of Commission of Inquiry into Expenses incurred by Litigants. Several institutional changes were innovated in an attempt to ameliorate this crisis. One was the selection of wealthy persons as chiefs, the winning candidate being one who would pay off the public debt. Another was making the undertaking of a law suit contingent upon the plaintiff's willingness to then assume the stool and to retire the debt it had incurred in clarifying its jurisdiction over his lands.

45. Björn Beckman, Organising the Farmers: Cocoa Politics and National Development in Ghana, (New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1976), p. 196; Dennis Austin, Politics in Ghana 1946-1960, pp. 253 ff.

46. Christopher Beer, The Politics of Peasant Groups; Western State of Nigeria, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Civil Disturbances Which Occurred in Certain Parts of The Western State of Nigeria in the Month of December 1968, Honourable Mr. Justice Ebenezer Olufemi Ayoola, (Ibadan: Government Printer, 1969).